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resting upon principles peculiar to the law governing the ad.
ministration of trusts. It is seldom the estate of the beneficiary can be reached by creditors, except in a court of equity;
and it seems to be an established principle prevailing there,
that any restraint against voluntary or involuntary alienation, will be approved wherever an opposite conclusion would
involve a destruction of the trust.
Wherever the interest of a beneficiary is so connected with
the interests of other beneficiaries in the same trust, that a
sale of it would impair those other interests or estates, a restriction against any form of alienation will be sustained: &cott
and wife v. Gibbons, 5 Munf. 86; Johnson v. Zane, 11 Gratt.
552; Harkham v. Garrant,4 Leigh 274; Perkins v. Dickinson, 3 Graft. 335; Hill and wife v. TcRae, 27 Ala. 175: 15

Eng. Oh. 81, 86, 87. But where the interest of a beneficiary
can be separated without injury to the remaining interests,
it is against the policy of the law that it should be enjoyed,
exempt from the claims of creditors. A court of equity will
enforce their claims against it, by sale or decree for an account: Rugby v. Robinson, 10 Ala. 702; Nickel v. Handley,
10 Graft. 336; Roans v. Archer, 4 Leigh 550; Riton v. Nor-

ton, 2 Beav. 63; Page v. Way, 3 Beav. 20.
The case of Grissom v. Hill, 17 Ark. 483, presents an interesting point, bearing upon the subject under consideration.
A restriction was attached to a trust of certain land, given to
a church for religious purposes, to the effect that it should
not be sold or encumbered. It was levied upon and sold under process of law. The court held, that if the sale tended
to defeat or impair the trust, a bill would lie to set it aside.
(To be continued.)
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Pending an action relating to church property, the Louisville Chancery
Court put the church into the possession of the marshal and made a decree,
from which an appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals reversed the decree
and remitted the record, with a mandate to the chancery to carry the opinion

26

FULTON V. FARLEY.
into effect. After this mandate had been filed in the chancery, but before it
had been entered of record or any final order to carry it into effect had been
made, suit was commenced in the United States Circuit Court to obtain poe.
session of the same church by other members who had acquired a domitll In
another State: lrde~d,
L That the intent with which the domicil was acquired wss immatbrial
2. That the first suit was still pending in the chancery when the bill was iled
in the Circuit Court, and therefore the lattex court could not acquire Jurlsdiction.
S. That even if the suit in the Circuit Court involved new issues between new
parties, the court could acquire no jurisdiction while the property was in the
custody of the Chancery Court.

IN 1866, Avery and others (through whom the defendants
in this suit claim as successors) filed a bill in this court against
Watson and others (through whom plaintiffs in this suit claim)
to establish their rights as kuling elders in th6 Walnut Street
Presbyterian Church in the city of Louisville. • The property
was put in charge of a marshal of the court, pendente lt, and
subsequently a decree was made for complainants, but the
Court of Appeals reversed this decree, and held that the title
of the complainants as ruling elders and trustees was not
valid according to the laws of the church. On February 21,
1868, the defendants in that suit filed in this court the opinion
of the Court of Appeals, with that court's mandate to carry
it into effect, and moved for an order on the marshal to restore them the church property. This was resisted, and various interlocutory proceedings took place, until September
18, 1868, when the opinion and mandate of the Court of Appeals were entered of record and the order of restitution was
made. The present action was instituted for the purpose of
enforcing alleged rights arising under the foregoing order of
court, because of the alleged unwillingness of some and the
incapacity of others of the persons named in said order to
have the same properly carried into effect--some of the persons named having ceased to be elders and trustees.
Between the filing of the decision of the Court of Appeals
(February 21, 1868) and the entry of it upon the record (September 18, 1868), Jones and others, who had been admitted
as church members by Avery and his party after the decision
of the Court of Appeals against Avery's title, filed a bill in the
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United States Circuit Court for the District of Kentucky,
making all the parties in the State court defendants, and asking
a decree that they were the rightful owners of the property
and members of the congregation. The Circuit Court assumed
jurisdiction and rendered a judgment precisely contrary to
that of the Court of Appeals. The question now before this
court was whether it should go on and carry into effect the
decree of the Court of Appeals as directed by its mandate.
The chancellor having declined to sit because he had been
of counsel in another suit involving some of the same matters,
A. Barnett, Esq., was elected by the Louisville bar as a special
chancellor. In his opinion the original case in the chancery
is called Avery v. Watson, and the suit in the Circuit Court
.ones et al. v. Matson.
BARNETT, Special Chancellor. [After stating the facts and
the condition of the record in detail]. The objections to the
Federal court jurisdiction, in the case of Jones et al. v. Watson, may for convenience be classed as follows:
1st. That the residence and citizenship of Jones and his coplaintiffs in Indiana, was not bona fide, was procured by fraud
and confederation, and was not such as authorized them to sue
in the Federal court. They had no right to sue in the Federal
court unless bona fide residents and citizens of Indiana. It
may be admitted that the evidence tends to show that they
were induced to remove to Indiana in order to enable them to
go into the Federal court with their claim, and yet an examina.
tion of the authorities forces the conclusion that the objection
is not well founded. It is the fact of citizenship in another
State, and not the motive which induced it, that controls the
question of jurisdiction: Cooper v. Galbraith,3 Wash. C. C.

516; Jones v. League, 18 Howard 76; Evans v. Davenport,

4 McLean 574. But those plaintiffs had no right to sue for
themselves and others, as was attempted in that case. Where
non-residency is the matter which confers jurisdiction on a
Federal court, and the suit is prosecuted for a joint interest
with others, only the parties named as plaintiffs have the right
to invoke the powers of the court, and they may sue for themselves and other non-residents, and for no others: United
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States v. Bank of Georgia,9 Wheaton 904; Governorof Georgia
v. Mandrazo, 1 Peters 110; Osburn v. Bank of the United
State , 9 Wheaton 738. This latter consideration is a matter
of no consequence perhaps in this case, for a court of equity
will do complete justice in every case where there is proper
jurisdicion in the court for any purpose. Besides, the objection to the jurisdiction of the Federal court was waived by
Watson, by failing to plead specially in abatement and before
answering to the merits of the case. There seems to have been
an effort to plead in abatement and answer to the merits at
the same time, which cannot be done under the rules of ancient
chancery practice. The answer on the merits waives the plea
when both are filed at the same time: Story's Equity Pleadings 657: Livingston v. Story, 11 Peters 352; Bailey v.
Dozier, 6 Howard 30; Sims v. Hennly, 6 Howard 1.
2d. It is urged against the jurisdiction of the Federal court
in the case of Jones v. Watson, that at the commencement of
that suit the case of Avery v. Watson was yet pending in the
State court, and that the State court had actual custody of the
property in dispute in thepossession of its receiver, the marshal.
3d. That at the commencement of that suit in the Federal
court the State court had such jurisdiction over the parties to
the case of Avery v. Watson, and all those claiming any interest under the parties to this last ease, as created a lis pendens
over the subject-matter and parties, which excluded any other
court from interfering with the matter in any. way whatever.
These two objections, similar in nature and depending somewhat on the same principles, will be considered together.
They present much more serious difficulties than the objection already disposed of, and their proper disposal is encumbered with a conflict of facts and authority quite embarrassing.
Whenever the action of one court is interposed as a bar to
fi-ther proceedings then being had in another court, if they be
courts of equal dignity and jurisdiction, the inquiry may arise,
had the court whose action is relied upon as a bar, the rightful
jurisdiction over the matter, according to the rules regulating
its jurisdiction, and then what has that court adjudged ? Rose
v. Hindly, 4 Cranch. 211; Thompson v. Tolmies, 2 Peters
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157; Wkox v. Jackson, 13 Peters 498 ; Forbes v. Bank U.
8 -10 Peters 49 ; Cook v. Hasey, 16 Peters 71; Hidey v.
Sluar4 3 Howard 75
All courts, whether State or Federal, in taking jurisdiction
over parties or subject-matter, must proceed according to the
rules regulating that matter. The Constitution and laws of the
United States recognize the ancient rules in chancery in England inherited by this country as binding on the Federal courts,
as well on questions of jurisdiction as others, were unchanged
by Act of Congress or rules of court, made by authority of
Congress. The sole ground of jurisdiction in the Federal court
in this case of Jones v. Watson, is the citizenship of the complainants in another State. If, at the commencement of that
suit, they had been citizens of Kentucky, their suit must have
been brought in a State court. Then the inquiry arises, they
being citizens of another State, is there any matter shown that
defeats their right to sue in the Federal court, and to deprive
that court of rightful jurisdiction? While considering this
inquiry it must be remembered that, as to this litigation, this
court and the Federal court, after once obtaining rightful juris.
diction of a matter, have precisely the same powers for enforcing rights and preventing wrongs, and in doing so, as to this
church property, are but enforcing the laws of Kentucky. Her
laws vested the title of this property where it is, and her laws
created the trust as it is. The two courts are then, as to this
matter, courts of concurrent jurisdiction.
It is manifest that anong courts thus organized and possessing as an original question equal powers, if there was no rule of
comityto prevent conflicts, such couflicts would be frequent and
troublesome. Each having original power to hear and determine disputes, might claim to do so in disregard of what was
being done, or had been done by the other. One would adjudge
one thing and enforce itsjudgments by injunction or process of
contempt, while the other might make and enforce by like
means a directly contrary judgment, which course, it is easy to
see, would soon involve the courts in disgraceful conflicts, and
the parties in dilemma utterly subversive of justice. In order
to avoid this kind[ of conflict and hardship upon litigants, courts
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of concurrent jurisdiction at a very early day adopted, and have
ever since'recognized a rule of guidance, by the observance of
which nothing like conflict can occur. That rule is stated by
Mr. Conkling, in his treatise on the Organization, Practice and
Jurisdiction of the courts of the United States, to be: "That
the court which first obtains possession of the controversy, or
of the property in dispute, must be allowed to dispose of it
finally, without interference or interruption from the co-ordinate court2' This rule, so con.cisely stated by Mr. Coakling,
has been established by a long line of precedents in England
and this country, and is recognized and affirmed in many cases
by the Supreme Court of the United States: Hagan v. Lucas,
10 Peters 400; Freeman v. Howe, 24 Howard 450; Taylor
v. Carryl,20 Howard 583. Now has this well-established
rule been violated by the judgment of the Federal court in this
case of Jones v. Watson ?

The suit of Avery v. Watson was

first brought in this court. In this case the issue was made as
to whom were elders in the church, and, of course, who had the
power to direct the use and possession of the church property
in the hands of the trustees. That issue was passed upon while
the property was in the hands of the court, but before its final
judgment is entered Jones and his co-plaintiffs undertake to
draw in question, in another court, the use and possession of

the same church property. The act of incorporation and the
general statute of this State as to church property vests the title
in the trustees. In Presbyterian churches, by the laws of the
church, the ruling elders have the power to regulate and direct

the use and possession of church edifices and property, so that
a dispute as to who are elders in a church practically involves

a dispute as to who has the right to use, manage and possess
the church property. At the time litigation was begun in the
Federal court, drawing in question the uses and possession of
the church property, the property itself was in the hands of the
State court, and a question there being passed upon it as to
who nad the right to use and possess said property. So that
tnere were two suits pending at the same time in different
courts, in which questions were being raised and decided as to
the use and possession of certain church property, and that
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propel Gy in the hands of one of the courts. At the date of the
institution of the Federal court suit, the Court of Appeals of
Kentucky had settled the principles controlling the question of
eldership in the church, but the mandate and opinion of that
court had not been entered, and no final judgment had been
entered in accordance with thad mandate and opinion. It
seems to this court that the case of Avery v. Watson was and
is pending until its final order in accordance with the'opinion
of the Court of Appeals is carried into effect, modified, or set
aside in some way for cause shown, by order which sends both
the parties and property out of court. The pendency of two
such causes in two different courts, naturally leads to the
results disclosed in this record as exhibited by the judgments
of the two courts. The conflict of the two judgments is so
palpable, and the impossibility of executing both so manifest,
that it is not necessary to point out details. But undoubtedly
the State court "first obtained possession of the controversy
and of the property in dispute." Has that court, according to
the judgment of the Federal court, been allowed to dispose of
it finally without interference or interruption from the coordinate court? Manifestly if the judgment of the Federal
court is binding, there never can be any such thing as executing the judgment of the State court.
If the church property was a fund in the registry of this
court, and while some parties were litigating their right to it.
other persons, claiming under some of the parties to the suit,
were to attempt to set on foot proceedings in some other court
of co-ordinate jurisdiction, there to assert their rights, would
it be insisted that this court was bound by anything decided
in that other court? The rule cited from Conkling furnishes
the answer. The rule seems to be well settled that such other
persons not parties, but claiming an interest in the funds, must
come into this court, and there sue, pro interresse suo, for his
own interest, or wait until'the parties and funds were passed
out of court into a field open for new litigation.
It is argued that the case in the Federal court involved new
issues between new parties. If the foregoing views are correct.
this would make no difference. The litigation, whatever it is,
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must be in the court where the property is. The facts of this
case furnish strong reasons for adhering to the old conservative
rule. In the first place, the thing in dispute was in this court.
in litigation about its proper use and possession, and there was
no room in another court for another suit about its use and
possession. In the next place, Jones and his co-plaintifi had
-been admitted members of the church by Avery, and they were
privies claiming under parties to the suit in the State court.
They were so admitted after the rendition of the opinion of the
Court of Appeals, viz.: on the - day of March, 1868. On
this state of facts, they were bound by the proceedings in the
State court as much as the parties thereto under whom they
claimed to have acquired property rights. They were upon
the footing of lis pendens purchasers, and are to be regarded
as such. The deposition of Jones and Hays proves that they
knew of the pendency of the suit in the State court, and also
knew of the nature tf the opinion of the Court of Appeals;
and also that the object of bringing the suit in the Federal
court was to obtain a different judgment, one that would destroy the effect of the judgment of the State court, their being
a conviction with them that they had not had, and could not
get, justice in the State courts.
If Jones and his co-plaintiffs started new issues in the Federal
court, and with new parties, and that justifies their suit, then
each newly admitted member can do the same thing, and the
litigation can go on ad infinitum, as long as new members can
be procured for the purpose. The doctrine of lis pendens cuts
off all this sort of endless multiplication of suits, and stops the
matter by reason of the rule before mentioned, and by the
additional rule which holds such persons bound by the proceedings had against parties under whom they claim: Kingsland
v. Spaulding, 3 Barbour's Chancery Reports, 341; Miller v.
Hall, 1 Bush. 229; Debile v. Foxworthy, 9 B. Mon. 228; Clark
v. Farrow 10 B. Mon. 446.
These views answer the suggestion that the jurisdiction of
this court had exhausted itself before the institution of the
suit in the Federal court, and also that the failure to supersede the first judgment of the court destroyed the is pendens.
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1. that failure to supersede ever had the effect to stop the Zis
pmdens, the perfection of the appeal revived it, and Jones and
others became members of the church after that had been
done, and took their interest subject to whatever judgments
might be finally made.
These considerations force the conclusion upon the court
that there was never at any time any such interregnum of the
jurisdiction of this court in the case of Avery v. Watson, oi
such a suspension of the lis pendens as to afford any opening
for the intervention of any other court, and that whatever any
other co-ordinate court may have decided, pending the case
in this court in regard to this property in dispute, has no
binding force upon this court, and presents no obstruction to
the further prosecution of the case now on trial. This conclusionis the more reluctantly-reached because it is opposedto
the deliberate opinion of the two learned judges who took
part in the trial of that cause in the Federal court. But, after
giving the matter patient investigation, aided by diligent
effort of counsel and an extended examination of authorities,
the conclusion has been reached and must now be announced,
thankful that, if erroneous, any injustice may be prevented
by the supervisory power of higher tribunals, conscious that
the conclusion is in no way influenced by bias or prepossessions in favor of either party to the contest.
It is alleged in the proceedings, and relied on in argument,
that Watson and the others whom this action seeks to have
pit in possession of the church edifice and property, under
the order of September, 1868, have seceded from, and quit
their connection with, the Presbyterian Church in the United
States of America, and that they now belong to another church.
And it is shown in support of this that by resisting the delverances of the superior court and tribunal of the church, they
have come under the excluding power of a kind of self-acting
knife of excision, which first cut them off from that church,
and being so cut off, they voluntarily united with another
organization, and, per consequence, now have no right in the
[ ropertyin dispute.
This matter has been substantially passed upon by the Courz
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of Appeals in the Bethel Union church case, ante 210, so far as
to indicate what will be the judgment of that court when the
question is made directly. This court concurs in the conclusions
announced in that case. The powver of the General Assembly
of the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America r'
make deliverances, establishing new do.trines and tests of
membership, is freely almitted, so far as the spiritual aspect
of the question is concerned. But the power of the General
Assembly under the form of church government, to raise up
these new tests, and then to enforce them by a wholesale exclusion of those who I) no' and cannot agree with them, presents
another question, wh3n th1at inability to believe in the new
tests is male the pretext for stripping the great body of the
members of the church in this State of all their rights of
property in church edifices and other church property.
This court assumes to adjudge nothing as to the spiritual
aspect of the matter, only asserts its convictions as to what is
the law of the State as to the questions of property involved.
The civil tribunals of this State, organized by and under the
Constitution and laws of the State, have no right to hand over
these property questions into the keeping and jurisdiction of a
non-resident tribunal not supposed to be learned in the laws of
the State, but are bound to dispose of such questions themselves
according to the law of the State. The deed from Humphrey
and wife to Watson and others for the lot on which the church
edifice stands, makes no mention of the Presbyterian Church
in the United States of America, but conveys it to them as
trustees of the Third Presbyterian church of the city of Louis.
ville and State of Kentucky. New tests and articles of faith
may be inserted in the church creed; but when a church body
seeks to strip people of property rights upon such new tests of
membership as the deliverances of the General Assembly upon
the subjects of loyalty, slavery and State rights, the historian
and the dispassionate lawyer will be very slow in assenting to
the proposition. Loyalty to a changeable and changing civil
government, which, like others before it, will sooner or latei
cease to exist, is to be made a test of church membership in
lrod's eternal church, that church, too, itself a successful rebel.
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lion against the authority of the Church of Rome--once venerable with age, whose authority was at onetime recognized by
nearly the whole of Christendom. Negro slavery, too, is to be
magnified into a test for membership-while slavery at one
time existed in each of the thirteen colonies, and even as late
as the formation of the present Federal Union. Under the
Constitution of the United States, the institution existed in all
of the States with one single exception, and all that time the
Presbyterian Church had existed, prospered and accomplished
much good, having among its most zealous and learned divines
slaveholders anddefenders of the institution. States rights, too,
a purely political and temporal aftir, is to be mignified into
such spiritual moment, as to make a negation of that political hobby a test of church membership in the church of the
Saviour, "whose kingdom is not of this world." It is much
easier to perceive how such bodies of men and individuals, who
erect such new and impossible tests, by so doing have cut
themselves off from the old church, than it is to perceive how
those who adhere to the old forms and faith have lost property
rights by so doing. There is nothing shown in this record by
which the church existing under the ministrations of Watson
and his co-elders has lost its identity as the true Third or
Walnut Street Presbyterian Church. Watson, Gault and
Hackney, the latter under suspension, were undoubtedly the
elders in said church at the date of the judgment appealed
from the 7th day of May, 1867. If so then, as the Court of
Appeals decided they were, the ecclesiastical succession was in
them, and no successor can become such except by their aid
and concurrence, and we must look to them as the starting
point in tracing the succession down to the present time. From
this it follows that the successors in office in the church session
of the Third or Walnut Street Presbyterian Church, and the
successors in office as trustees in said church, in succession
under the ministrations of the ruling elders, who were adjudged
ruling elders by the Court of Appeals, in the case of Avery v.
'Watson, now compose the church session, and are now the
lawful trustees in said church. And it also follows that the
persons assuming to act as session and trustees, in opposition

-112

FULTON V. FARLEY.

to the will and concurrence of those in the true succession, as
herein decided, have no such rights. It also follows that ttiose
persons admitted to membership by the unlawfully constituted
session have no interest or right in the church edifice and
property, and that the plaintiffs in this action are entitled to
have the order of this court of September 28th, 1868, in the
case of Avery v. Watson, carried into effect by proper orders.
and to have the church edifice and property delivered into the
possession of Watson, Gault, Heeter and Given, as elders, and
Fulton, Farley and Polk, as trustees in said church.
The foregoing case seems to us
to involve one Inquiry of vital inaportance to the question of constitutional and responsible government in
this country as opposed to what
in some countries is called personal
government, and may here property
be Mlled congressional government,
or the government of the numerical
majority. Without attempting to define which kind of government is, at
the present time, best suited to the
exigencies of events, we think it cannot fail to be of interest to every
member of the profession to note the,
advance of the trial of the issue between the two. We do not expect
that the Supreme Court of the nation
is yet so far demoralized upon these
old questions of constitutional construction as to be prepared to affirm
the judgment of the Circuit Court of
the Kentucky district in this case.
But if such an event does occur, the
issue, as we understand it, will be
lairly joined, between State and national authority, within the States,
upon questions confessedly within
the jurisdictions of the States, and not
in any sense affecting the national
authority within its prescribed functions.
We have already expressed our
own opinion in the April number of

this magazine. in regard to the ab.
stract legal questions involved in this
controversy. We should have felt
compelled, sitting as a judge in the
Kentucky Court or Appeals, to affirm
the action of the General Assembly,
not so much upon the ground of its
innate wisdom and. justice as of its
being the final decision of a court of
exclusive Jurisdiction, acting within
the sphere of that jurisdiction. Had
we been a member of the General
Assembly, while sympathizing in the
main with the opinion of the majority, in regard to the right and duty
of the nation to vindicate its own existence and legitimate action, within
its proper sphere, by force of arms, if
need be, against all resistance, and of
the duty of the General Assembly to
uphold, by all lawful means, the arm
of the national sovereignty, wthin
its appropriate limits, we should at
the same time have felt the most intense repugnance against making action or opinion upon these fairly debatable political questions a test of
church membership. But we should,
with .our present light upon that
subject, have felt compelled to hold
that these questions as affectig
church membership, did come fairly
and legitimately within the jurisdiction of the highest church Judicato.
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:Hs, and we should, therefdre, bae tie where they reside in dlfteent
uIpbld their actioa, although operat- States, and having to deal only wrtb
and ma we feel, unjustly State laws and State rights. This
i
svrely,
v
ipm the members whoe position provision of the United States Con.
and rights In the church were so fun- stitution, by which the national
damentallyaffectedby the action ofthe courts sustain actions between the
residents of different States, is entirely
Ueneral Assembly.
But if we understand the present anomalous and was provided for the
attitude of the questioa, and rightly purpose of enabling the citizens of
comprehend its bearing upon the con- different States to secure an impartial
troversy, It Is fast tending toward a tribunal to decide upon their rights
comfict of authority in the State of under State laws. The whole thing
Kentucky, which nothing but the as between the State and nationaljurssuperior wisdom of the highest na- diction, Is abnormal, and has always
tional tribunal can avert, unless the been so regarded; and the Act of Conone party or the other prove recreant gress, under which these suits in or.
to the maintenance of the opinions dinary civil actions are maintained
which they avow. We think the in the national courts, has so guarded
foregoing opiniou of the chancellor the matter that the national courts
is the only one which could properly act merely as subordinate State courts.
have been declared by the learned in passing upon such controversies.
judge under the circumstances. It is, The process and the course of trial
In fact, nothing more than carrying is, in all respects, conformed to the
out the mandate of the Court of Ap- laws of the State within which the propsals, of which the Court of Chancery ceeding is had, at the date of the
Is merely a department or depend- Act of Congress. And the decision
aney, and as truly a servant as any is required from the very nature of
subordinate tribunal or officer ever the case, to be made according to the
Is of his superior. There was, as we law of the State, when the cause of
anderstand the question, no alterna- action arises there, and the national
tive but obedience or rebellion, and courts have all held that the unqueswe have always intended and attemp- tionable and infallible evidence of
ted, to the utmost of our ability. to the law of the State is the final deci
resist "all sedition, privy conspiracy sion of the highest court of the State.
and rebellion," in the explicit lan- thus making the trited States Circuit
guage of the Common Prayer, and in Court, in this class of aotions to all
intents and purposes, a subordinate
all its forms and guises.
And it 29 that which causes our State court, bound to conrorm its deamazement at the action of the United cision to that of the highest State
States Circuit Court in this case, as
here stated. That court, in this suit,
is really acting as a State court, having Its jurisdiction under the United
States Constitution, but really none
the less acting upon a cause of action
purely and exclusively of State cognizance, except in this class of par-

court.
The status of tbes. two suits is thus
made apparent. The Circuit Court
within the District ot Kentucky is a
court of concurrent jurisdiction with
the State courts, both in matters of
law and equity, as To all causes of
action existing between citizens of
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different States. And in all such causes
the court first taking jurisdiction of
the subject-matter, will retain it until
finished. This Is abundantly shown in
the English practice, where, at present
there are fourcourts of equityjurisdiction of first instance, of concurrent
powers, constantly in session. And it
requires no great power of the imagination to comprehend the state of interminable perplexity which must ensue if one of these courts could
be stripped of its Jurisdiction and the
controversy transferred to another, at
the election of either party or of any
new party interested in the controversy. The same rule is recognized
in repeated instances in the decisions
of the national courts, and we make
no question will be again reaffirmed
when this case in the Circuit Court
reaches, if it ever does, the tribunal
of last resort. The determination of
that court to vindicate Its dignity, as
well as its purity, in not allowing
even a doubtful question to receive a
reargument in consequence of any
change in the members of the court
merely, has received a very signal and
creditable illustration on a recent occasion; and it is one which gives assurance that there is at least'one place
in the judiciary of the country where
arguments of expediency, when coming in conflict with the decorum and
the independence of judicial administration, have, as yet, been able to find
no lodgment.
The rule as laid down in that court
upon the subject is: In all cases of
concurrent jurisdiction, the court
which first had possession of the subject must determine it exclusively:
6UWh v. McIver, 9 Wheaton 532;
Taylor v. Carryl, 20 How. 83 ; MalUe v. Dezter, I Curt. 178; Er parte
6 McLean 5% Where
Robinso

two tribunals have concurrent JurI
diction, the one which first obtaina
possession of the subject must adjudcate. and neither party can be forced
into another jurisdiction: Bleby v.
Bacon, 10 How. 53. Other cases
might be cited, but the principle is too
unquestionable to admit of much dis.
cussion. The precedents are all in
one direction: Story, Eq. FL, § 736
-741.
But what renders this case more
anomalous is, that the highest court
of the State had made its final determination, not only upon the case but
upon the subject ol controversy,before
there seems to have been any attempt
to transfer the same into the Circuit
Court. The action of the State court
had thus become final upon the Circuit Court, as it seems to us, in two
points of view. First, that it settles
a principle of law, and as evidence
of the law which must govern the Circuit Court was conclusive. Second, It
disposed of the whole controversy In
a manner to be equally binding upon
all the members of the congregation.
so that no new members could properly bring it in question In any concurrent jurisdiction.
In this state of the case It seemed,
as before stated, not a little surprising
that there should have been any disposition in the Circuit Court to listen
to any appeal to that tribunal in any
form. For if the form of the proceed,
Ing were ever so much changed, so as
to be entirely new and independent
of the proceeding in the State court.
the decision of the Court of Appeals
of the State would be none the less
binding upon the Circuit Court of the
United States as a rule of action in
declaring the law. We must conJecture there was some misapprehensio
in regard te the action of the Circuit
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Vonrt or the grounds upon which they
claim to proceed, if there were any
grounds for it. We take it as stated
in the report of the opinion of the
chancellor, which must of course be
authentic and it seems to admit of but
one construction. We can comprehend well enough why a convention
of self-constituted delegates might recommend a resort to some such action
aq is reported in this case to have been
taken in the Circuit Court; but that
it should receive the countenance of a
court of such dignity and learning as
this court, is not to us easily conceived
of, unless some new lights in jurisprudence are about to loom upon us,

whih we should not expect to come
from so enlightened a source. The
opinion of the chancellor states the
law of the case very fully, and, as it
seems to us, with great fairness and
force; and we should be surprised if
there were not soberness and moderation enough left in the old and staid
Republic of Kentucky-the State producing- such men as Clay and Critten.
den, to look at the matter more calmly
than to carry this contest between the
State and national courts into any.
thing like actual conflict, and especially in a case to obviously free front
all reasonable ground of doubt.
I. P.R.

United States Circuit Court, District of Iowa.
UNITED STATES EX REL. LANSING V. THE TREASURER OF MUSCA
TINE COUNTY.
A writ of mandamus ordering the levy and collection of a tax is an appro.
plrate and proper process to enforce judgments against public corporations in
the State of Iowa.
The Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Iowa, has the
power and it is its duty, if necessary, to issue writs of mandamus for this
purpose.
These writs, when thus issued, are in the nature of writs, of .tlerl facias, and
the State courts have no power or right to interfere with their execution.
Where writs of mandamus directed to the county treasurer, ordering the
collection of a tax are disobeyed, thwarted or evaded, the United States Court
issuing the writ of mandamus, may, when necessary, appoint its marshal to
execute the same and collect the taxes.
Underwhat circumstances this power willbe exercised, discussed by DmxoN, J.
An Act of the Legislature, in terms discriminating against taxes levied to
pay Judgments upon railroad bonds and coupons held void because it impaired
the obligation of the contract under which the bonds were issued.

IN this cause and in various others of a similar nature, the

judgment creditors of sundry counties in this State, who have
heretofore had peremptory writs of mandamus issued to county
officers to collect taxes sufficient to pay their judgments, move
the court, upon affidavits and verified informations, to appoint
the marshal for the district of Iowa to execute said writs and
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collect the said taxes in the place of the county treasurers.
The other facts appear in the opinion of the court.
John X. Rogers, Grant & Smith, and Ednonds & Ransom,
for the motion.
Rush Clarke, D. C. Cloud, and Williams, contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
DILLON, Circuit J.-Heretofore judgments have been ren.
dered in this court on what are termed railroad bonds and
coupons against the counties of Lee, Washington, Louisa, Muscatine, Johnson, Iowa and Poweshiek. To enforce the payment
writs of mandamus have at previous terms been ordered to be
issued, commanding the proper county officers to levy and collect taxes sufficient to pay those judgments. At a term of this
court held one year ago, it was shwn that the county officers
of most, if not all of these counties, had either neglected or
refused to levy and collect the taxes required by the mandates
of this court. On being attached for contempt they gave as a
reason for their non-action that the bonds upon which the
judgmert in this court had been rendered were, in the opinion of the Siate courts, unconstitutional and1 that they had
been enjoined by the State courts in proceedings to which
the judgment creditors were not parties) from making the
levies which this court had commanded.
Following the express decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States on the precise point, this court (Mr. Justice
MILLER and Judge LOVE, both being present and concurring)
then held the State courts had no authority to enjoin or otherwise interfere with the execution of the process of this court ;
that injunctions issued from the State courts for that purpose
were unauthorized, and in law afforded no protection to the
county offlcers for their neglect or refusal to obey the process
of this court.
But under the circumstance,, the officers were discharged
from actual arrest under the attachments for contempt on the
payment of costs, and on their promise to return home and
levy the taxes required by the writs of mandamus.
The returns subsequently made to the court show that they
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dd, as promised, make orders levying the taxes; but in respect
To some counties, particularly those of Lee, Johnson and Muscatine, there is a showing made at this term that the taxes
thus levied have not to any considerable extent been collected.
It has been made to appear to the court, that in Lee county,
the efforts of the county treasurer to make the taxes have been
practically defeated, and the same remain almost wholly uncol
lected. This has been brought about, in part, where personal
property has been distrained by the county collector, by replevin 'suits commenced against him by tax-payers in the
State courts. It is also shown that there are combinations
made to prevent the attendance of bidders at such tax sales,
and to deter them from bidding; and in one instance, that an
agent of one of the judgment creditors who attended at advertised sales of property was prevented by threats from bidding,
and forced to leave by apprehensions of personal danger.
It also appears that since the decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States, and also since the decision of the Supreme
Court of the State to the effect, that.the process of officers of the
Federal courts cannot be enjoined or interfered with by State
courts, that one or more of the State district judges have issued
injunctions against the collectors of Muscatine and Lee counties,
undertaking to prohibit them from collecting the taxes which
this court has ordered to be made; and that such injunctions
have been obeyed, and the collections practically prevented.
The county collector of Johnson county in answer to an
information filed against him, admits that he has not collected
more than about one-fifth of the levy; that he is advised and
believes that combinations have been formed to prevent the
compulsory collection of such taxes; that he finds it impossible,
by reason of such combinations to find responsible deputies to
assist in making collections, and in view of these facts, he
"asks the appointment of the marshal of this court to collect
the said tax, or proceed under him (the county collector) to
make such collection," and for direction as to the interest and
penalties he shall collect.
A sworn statement of a similar character has been made at
this term by the collector of the county of Muscatine, w, o also
27
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asks both the aid and direction of this court. Because the
taxes have not been in fact collected in various counties in
obedience to the mandates of this court, and because it is
claimed that by reason of the facts before stated, and others
no- recited, that it is impracticable for the county collectors to
comply with the writs of mandamus which have been issued,
the judgment creditors of the various counties above mentioned have applied to the court for an order appointing the
marshal to execute the writs of mandamus and make collections
of the taxes. This is the question now before the court. That
this court has the power to make such appointment, and that
if the county officers either will not, or cannot themselves collect the taxes, that it is the duty of the court to appoint its
own officers to execute its process, are points not longer open
to controversy, because they have been precisely and definitely
settled by the Supreme Court of the nation.
This is a power of a very delicate nature, and one which,
although affirmed by the highest tribunal in the land to exist,
we would not feel inclined to exert except in case of necessity.
But when the necessity exists it is our duty, one from which
there is no escape, to exercise the power. When does the
necessity exist ? Obviously when the county officers will not,
or in consequence of public excitement, combinations or suitin State courts, cannot execute the commands of the writs of
this court to collect tht. taxes.
When a court issues its process it is bound to see that its
lawful commands are neither disobeyed nor evaded. That these
writs of mandamus are lawful commands, and that the creditors
of the counties are entitled to these writs, and also entitled to
have them executed and obeyed, are no longer questions open
to controversy, since they have been decided, not once simply,
but time and time again by tlhe Supreme Court of the United
States. They are settled, and any inquiry whether the Siipreme Court of the United States ought to have settled the,,
otherwise, is fruitless, and without any practical value.
But this is not all that is settled. The Supreme Court of
the United States has also decided that writs of mandamus are
appropriate and proper process to enforce judgments against
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public corporations in this State; that the Federal courts have
the power, and that is their duty to issue such writs; that
they are in the nature of writs of execution, and that State
courts have no more right to interfere with their execution
than they have to interfere with the marshal when executing
an ordinaryfieri facias. The iourt cannot question the correctness of their decisions; pnd they are equally binding upon
the State courts, because the decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States, as to the extent of the jurisdiction of the
Federal courts, and as to the- validity and conclusiveness of
their judgments, and as to what process may be resorted to
to enforce them and how such process shall be executed, bind
Congress, bind all the Federal courts, and bind also State legislatures and State courts and judges.
It so happens that every judge who is entitled to sit in this
court is a citizen of this State; and none of them have failed
to express and manifest their sympathy, in all proper ways,
with those counties and cities which have, unfortunately, become so heavily indebted.
It would be no act of kindness to the people of these counties
and cities for this court to either ignore the decisions of the
Supreme Court or refuse to carry out the principles which it
has decided, for in the end, and before long, we too would be
compelled to obey its mandates. It is the superior tribunal.
and we have no choice but to obey and carry out its decisions.
Nor would it be an act of kindness to these cities and counties
to pursue any course or to say or do anything which would encourage the hope that any change of views on the part of the
Supreme Court was possible, or that by any litigation there
remained any-chance whatever to defeat the right of the bondholders to recover and collect their judgments. After a careful study of the decisions referred to, and of the grounds on
which they are placed, we feel bound to say, and think it important that the people should understand, that all hope of
escape from them by means of further litigation, either in the
Federal or State courts, is without any sort of foundation, is
wholly illusory, and will deceive whoever relies upon it. So
far as the State courts are concerned, they are, for the reasons
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before stated, utterly powerless to afford any relief, since they
have no right whatever to interfere with the Federal courts
or their prooess or officers.
As respects the counties of Lee, Johnson and Muscatine, it
is the opinion of the court upon the showing made to it, that
it is its duty to appoint the marshal to execute the writs of
mandamus; but in the two counties last named the marshal
will not proceed to act unless it shall be shown to the court or
some one of its judges that the county officer is disobeying
the writ, or failing duly to cause the same to be executed.
In Lee county the showing made to the court is such as to
entitle the relators to have the marshal appointed and directed to act at once.
It is proper to add, that this appointment will be rescinded
whenever it is shown that the county officers are willing and
able themselves to execute the writs of mandamus. It should
be understood that the marshal is the officer of this court; that
he is not subject in the execution of his official duties to the
control of any proceeding or process of the State courts; that
any interference with him is unauthorized; that any resistance
to him is an offense against the laws of the United States, and
punishable as such in the courts of the United States, and that
it is the duty of the President to support him with all the
power necessary to enable him to execute the process and orders
of this court. The people of Iowa are law-abiding, and with
this plain statement what the law is, the members of this court
gladly avail themselves of this occasion to declare that it is
their firm conviction that the law will be respected and obeyed.
It only remains to add that the act of the Iowa legislature of
last winter, discriminating especially against the taxes levied to
pay judgments upon railroad bonds, is in contravention of the
provisions of the national Constitution prohibiting the States
from passing laws "impairing the obligation of contracts."
This is plain upon a comparison of that act with the laws in
force under which the bonds were issued (Code, 1851; sees
116 to 124; Rev., sees. 252, 260), especially when made in the
light of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States,
expounding the constitutional provision above mentioned: -an
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Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall. 535; Bronson v. Kinsie,
1 Howard 316; Butz v. City of fum catine, 8 Wall. 575; &ee
County v. Rogers, 7 Wall. 175.
LovE, D. J., concurred.

Supreme Court of the United States.
WIIJIAM H. NORRIS, J.,

V. THOMAS JACKSON.

The 4th section of the Act of March 5th, 1865, establishes the mode in which
parties may submit eases to the court withouta jury, and the manner in which
a review of the law of such cases may be had in this court.
The special finding of the facts mentioned in that statute is not a mere report of the evidence, but a finding of those ultimate facts on which the law
must determine the rights of the parties.
If the finding of facts be general, only such rulings of the court, in the pro.
gress of the trial, can be reversed, as are presented by a bill of exception.
In such cases a bill of exceptions cannot be used to bring up the whole testi.
mony for review, any more than in a trial by jury.
Objections to the admission or rejection of evidence, or to such rulings or
propositions of law as may be submitted to the court, must be shown by bill
of exceptions.
If the parties desire a review of the law of the case, they must ask the court
to make a special finding which raises the question, or get the court to rule on
the legal propositions which they present.
In an action of ejectment, where the plaintiff's title is that of a voluntary
purchaser under an execution void because the lien of the judgment had
expired, and the title of the defendant is that of a bona ide purchaser from
the debtor during the continuance of the lien, it is not competent for '.he
plaintiff to prove that the defendant promised the creditor, under whose execution the land was sold, to pay the judgment, and that he did not do so, in
consequence of which the lien was suffered to expire. The fact, if proved,
would not extend the lien of the judgment.

THIS was an action of ejectment, tried in the Circuit Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, to whom it was sub.

mitted without a jury.
At the close of a long bill of exceptions, erfibracing all the
evidence, which consisted of judgments, executions, deeds, depositions, admissions and agreements of the parties, it is
said that "the foregoing was all the cause, and the court
thereupon found the issues and rendered judgment for the
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defendant, to which decision and ruling of the court the
plaintiff then and there excepted."
By section four of the Act of March 3, 1865, 13 U. S.
Statutes 50, it is provided that parties may submit the issues
of fact in civil cases, to be tried and determined by the court,
without the intervention of a jury. The language of the
section is as follows:
"The finding of the court upon the facts, which finding
shall be general or special, shall have the same effect as the
verdict of a jury. The rulings of the court in the cause, in
the progress of the trial, when excepted to at the time, may be
reviewed by the.Supreme Court of the United States upon a
writ of error, or upon appeal, provided the rulings be duly
presented by a bill of exceptions. When the finding is
special, the review may also extend to the determination of
the sufficiency of the facts found to support the judgment.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MILLER, J.-The first thing to be observed in this enactment is that it provides for two kinds of findings in regard
to the facts, to wit: general and special. This is in perfect
analogy to the findings by a jury, for which the court is in
such cases substituted by the consent of the parties. In other
words, the court finds a general verdict on all the issues for
plaintiff or defendant, or it finds a special verdict.
This special finding has often been considered and described by this court. It is not a mere report of the evidence,
but a statement of the ultimate facts on which the law of the
case must determine the rights of the parties, a finding of the
propositions of fact which the evidence establishes, and not
the evidence on which those ultimate facts are supposed- to
rest: Burr v. Des Moines Co., 1 Wallace 99; Graham v.
Bayne, 18 Howard 62.
The next thing to be observed is, thut whether the finding
be general or special, it shall have the same effect as the verdict
of a jury. That is to say, it is conclusive as to the facts so
found. In the case of a general verdict, which includes or may
include, as it generally does, miced questions of law and fact, it
concludes both, except so far as they may be saved by somae
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exception which the party has taken to the ruling of the
court on the law.
In the case of a special verdict the question is presented as
it would be if tried by a jury, whether the ,facts thus found
require a judgment for plaintiff or defendant, and this being
matter of law, the ruling of the court on it can be reviewed in
this court on that record. If there were such special verdict
here we could examine its sufficiency to sustain the judgment.
But there is none. The bill of exceptions, while professing
to detail all the evidence, is no special finding of the facts.
The judgment of the court, then, must be affirmed, unless
the bill of exceptions presents some erroneous ruling of the
court in the progress of the trial.

The only ruling in the progress of the trial to which exception was taken by plaintiff, was to the refusal of the court
to permit him to prove that Hiram Getchell, the landlord of
,defendant, had promised to pay the judgment under which
the land was sold to plaintiff.
We do not see that this was a matter of which plaintifi a
volunteer purchaser, had any right to complain. It could
not extend the lien of the judgment beyond the time fixed by
law, which seems to be the purpose for which it was offered.
We have taken some pains to comment on the mode in
which cases tried by the court, which are properly triable by
a jury, may be reviewed here. Attention was called to the
statute of 1865, in the case of Tweed v. Insurance Co., 7
Wallace 44, and we condense here the results of an examination of that statute.
1. If the verdict be a general verdict, only such rulings of
the court in the progress of the trial can be reviewed as are pre.

sented by bill of exceptions, or as may arise on the pleadings.
2. In such cases a bill of exceptions cannot be used to
bring up the whole testimoDy for review any more than in a
trial by jury.

3. That if the parties desire a review of the law involved
in the case, they must either get the court to find a special
verdict which raises the legal propositions, or they must pre-
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sent to the court their propositions of law, and require the
court to rule on them.
4. That objection to the admission or exclusion of evidence, or to such ruling on the propositions of law as the
the party may ask must appear by bill of exceptions.
As the only ruling of the court in this case that we can examine seems to have been correct, the judgment is affirmed.

Court of Apeals of Ha-2yland.
ELIAS WARD V. THE STATE OF MARYLAND.
The Act of 1868, ch. 413, provides that "11No person not being a permanent
resident in this State shall sell, offer for sale, or expose for sale, within the lim.
its of the city of Baltimore, any goods, wares or merchandise whatever, other
than agricultural products, and articles manufactured in the State of Mary.
land, within the limits of the said city, either by card, sample or other speci-.
men, or by written or printed trade-list or catalogue, whether such person be
the maker or manufacturer thereof or not, without first obtaining a license so
to do." On an indictment against a party for a violation of this law, Held:
1. That said law is not repugnant to that clause of the 8th section of the 1st
srticle of the Constitution of the United States, which grants to Congress the
power " to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian tribes."
2. That it Is not repugnant to that clause of the 2d section of the 4th article
of the Constitution which declares that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States."
& That it is within the power of a State t, tax, in the shape of a license, any
trade, business or occupation, when carried on in its borders by those who are
not permanent residents of the State, whether foreigners or citizens of other
States.
4. That even if this law is to be regarded as restrictive and discriminating in
its character and design, it still simply imposes a tax on a particular business
carried on in a particular mode within the limits of the State, which it is -'erfectly competent for the legislature to regulate and restrain.

APPEAL from the Criminal Court of Baltimore city.

The appellant was indicted for that, not being a permanent

resident of this State, he did, on the 4th of December, 1868,
sell by sample, within the limits of Baltimore city, certain
goods, wares and merchandise, described in the indictment
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other than agricultural products and articles manufactured in
the State of Maryland, without first obtaining a license so to
do, contrary to the provisions of the Act of 1868, ch. 413. It
was admitted that the appellant, being at the time a citizen of
the United States, and a citizen of and residing in the State of
New Jersey, did commit the act and deed charged in the indictment, by selling by sample twelve bridle fronts and six leather
blinkers for horse harness, without a license, and thereby vio.
lated this Act of the General Assembly of Maryland.. The
case was submitted for the purpose of obtaining the opinion
and judgment of the court upon the question, whether this
act is constitutional and valid. The court below adjudged
the party guilty, and imposed the fine prescribed in the law,
and from this judgment this appeal was taken.
The law enacts that "no person, not being a permanent
resident of this State, shall sell, offer for sale, or expose for
sale, within the limits of the city of Baltimore, any goods,
wares or merchandise, other than agricultural products and
articles manufactured in the State of Maryland, within the
limits of said city, either by card, sample or other specimen,
or by written or printed trade list or catalogue, whether such
person be the maker or manufacturer thereof or not, without
first obtaining a license so to do." The rate of license is
fixed at three hundred dollars, to run one year from date,
and the penalty for so selling without license is, for each offense, not less than four hundred nor more than six hundred
dollars.
George C. Jfaund and A. Stirling, Jr., for the appellant.
The law under consideration requires the non-resident to
pay for his license to sell goods by sample, etc., the sum of
three hundred dollars, which is twice as large a sum as it
exacts from the resident engaged-whether selling by sample
or otherwise-in the most extensive mercantile transactions:
Code of Pub. Genl. Laws, article 56, section 55.
The power to exact from the non-resident more money for a
license to sell goods than from the resident, involves the power
to prohibit the ion-resident from selling altogether: Brown et
VOL. XVIIL
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al. v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 439; Mculloch v. Maryland, 4
Wheat. 316; Norris v. The (Jity of Boston, 7 Howard 283;
Gibbons v. Ogden,9 Wheat. 196; Groves v. Slaughter, 15 Pet.
511; Holmes v. Jennison, 14 Pet. 570; Louisiana v. S. Hf.
Kennedy & Co., 19 La. 397; and particularly the opinion of
MOIxLNA, J., in Smith v. Turner, 7 Howard 283.
Commerce among the several States is traff among the
several States; it may mean more than traffic, but it at least
means so much: Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 189. Congress
has regulated traffic between the citizens of the States, by
leaving it free between the citizens of the different States.
"It has been well remarked, that the regulation of commerce
consists as much in negative as in positive action :" MeLAI,
J., in Smith v. Turner.
The question of difficulty is, not whether the State may, as
in this case, charge more to the non-resident than the resident
for a license to sell and introduce into this State goods located
in another State, but whether she can require for such a pur.
pose, or from any one, a license at all. It may, with considerable confidence, be asserted that she cannot: Brown et
al. v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419; Louisiana v. Kennedy, 19
La. 397 ; Penna.v. Philadelphiaand Reading 1B. B. Co., Baltimore Law Transcript, May 12th, 1869.
The law in question violates the second section of the fourth
article of the Constitution of the United States, which declares
that "the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States :" Cooley,
Con. Lim., 16-397, and the authorities cited in the margin:
Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371; Campbell v. Morris, 3
H. and McEH. 554; Crandell v. State, 10 Conn. 343, 344.
Isaac D. Jones, Attorney General, for the appellee.
Commerce " among the several States" does not comprehend
any commerce which is purely internal, between man and man
in a single State, or between different parts of the same State,
and not extending to or affecting other States. Commerce
amongthe States means commerce which concerns more States
than one. It is not an apt phrase to indicate the mere interior
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traffc of a single State. The completely internal commerce
of a State may be properly considered as reserved to the State
itself: 2 Story on the Constitution, sec. 1061; Gibbons v. Ogden,
9 Wheat. 194; Brown v. Maryland,12 Wheaton 446-447; 1
Kent's Com. 436-437.
, Again, the power to regulate commerce is not at all like that
to lay taxes. The latter may well be concurrent, while the
former is exclusive. The power of Congress in laying taxes
is not necessarily or naturally inconsistent with that of the
States. Each may lay a tax on the same property without
interfering with the action of the other: 2 Story on the Const.,
see. 1064; Gibbons v. Ogdn, 9 Wheaton 1.
The Constitution of the United States treats the power to
lay taxes and the power to regulate commerce as distinct and
independent powers: 2 Story on the Const., see. 1065.
It is further contended by the appellant that the law in
question violates the provision of the Constitution of the
United States, which declares that "the citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several States."
The claim of the appellant, as set up in this case, is to
come into this State and enjoy more privileges and immunities than are accorded to citizens of the State. The meaning
of this provision is, that the citizens of one State were not to
be deemed aliens in another State, not entitled to take or hold
real estate, or other privileges, except as other aliens. The
intention was to confer a general citizenship, and to communicate all the privileges and immunities which citizens of the
same State would be entitled to under the like circumstances:
3 Story on the Const., sec. 1800: Campbell v. .2orris,3 H. &
McH. 554.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MiLLER, J.-The same provision as that in question, so far as
applicable to a case like this, is contained in the Code, art. 56, §.
37, etc., and has been the law of the State since 1852, a period of
seventeen years. No question has hitherto been raised as to
the power of the legislature to enact such a law. It is now
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assailed upon the ground of repugnancy to two provisions of
the Constitution of the United States.
1st. To that clause of the eighth section of the first article,
which grants to Congress the power "'toregulate commerce
with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian tribes."
2d. To that clause of the second section of the fourth article, which declares that "the citizens of each State shall be
entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the
several States."
. Before examining the decisions of the Supreme Court, which
upon such questions are binding and authoritative expositions
of the Constitution, and to which the courts of all the States
should yield respectful obedience, it is proper to ascertain what
the law before us is, and what it seeks to accomplish. It is not a
law which, upon its face, purports to levy a tax by way of license
to sell, upon either foreign or domestic imports, whilst remaining in the hands of the importer in original packages. The
indictment does not charge, nor does the record show that the
goods sold by the appellant were goods of this description. Nor
does the law purport to be a tax upon the transit ofgoods through
the State for traffic or commercial purposes. But it is a tax
upon a particular business or trade, carried on entirely within
the limits of the State. Maryland, in common with other
States, has subjected to taxation, by way of license, and as a
source of revenue, every kind of business or trading carried on
within her limits. With respect to her own citizens, her laws
provide that no person or corporation within this State, other
than the the grower, maker or manufacturer, shall barter or
sell any goods, wares or merohandise, without first obtaining
a license in the mode prescribed, and these licenses are graded
according to the amount of merchandise or stock on hand,
held by each person at the principal season of sale. There is
nothing in this or any other law of the State, which prohibits or restrains non-resident merchants, manufacturers or
traders, or their agents, from bringing their goods here and selling them in the same mode and under the same license as
resident- of the State. A custom, however, has grown up iu
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recent times with merchants and manufacturers, in the large
manufacturing and commercial cities and States, of traveling
or sending agents or runners through other States and cities,
with samples, cards, catalogues or trade lists of their goods,
and thereby selling by retail or wholesale large quantities of
merchandise, located beyond the limits of the States where they
thus sell, and not subject to the local State, county or municipal taxation, as are like goods in the hands of resident merchants or traders, to the great detriment of the business and
trade of the latter. Large sales are thus made, and an extensive and lucrative business is thus carried on, and it is the object of the law in question to search and subject to taxation,
by means of a license, the trade and business thus transacted
within the limits of the principal city of this State. It is,
therefore a tax upon a particular business or trade, carried on
in a particular mode within the limits of the State, by a particular class of persons, and not a tax upon goods or merchandise imported into the State, either from foreign countries or
from other States, and the question is as to the power of the
State to impose such tax.
1st. In reference to the first clause of the Constitution of the
United States above quoted, all of the decisions of the Supreme
Court agree that it confers upon Congress no power of regulation
or direct control over the internal commerce or domestic trade
of the States: License Tax Cases, 5 Wallace 470. As said by
Mr. Justice McLEAN, in delivering the opinion of the courtin
the case of A'athanv. Louisiana, 8 How. 80-82, "The right of
a State to tax its own citizens for the prosecution of any pat
ticular business or profession within the State has not been
doubted; and we find that in every State money or exchange
brokers, venders of merchandise of our own or foreign manufacture, retailers of ardent spirits, tavern keepers, auctioneers,
those who practice the learned professions, and every description of property, not exempted by law, are taxed. The taxing power of a State is one of its attributes of sovereignty. And
when there has been no compact with the Federal government,
or cession of jurisdiction for the purposes specified in the Constitution, this power reaches all the property and business
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within the State, which are not properly denominated the
means of the general government; and as laid down by this
court, it may be exercised at the discretion of the State." Such
is the emphatic language of the Supreme Court on this subject.
Nor is it, we apprehend, less within the power of a State to
tax, in the shape of a license, any trade, business or occupation, when carried on in its borders by those who are not
permanent residents of the State, whether foreigners or citizens
of other States. Most of the States have exercised such power
in the enactment of laws, requiring licenses from hawkers and
peddlers, in the imposition of a tax, either direct or by way of
license, upon the agents of foreign insurance companies and
other corporations doing business within their limits, and by
laws similar in character to the one now under consideration.
In Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat. 419, a law of this State
which required all importers of foreign articles to take out a
license to sell their importations in the original bale or package
was held to be invalid, because repugnant to theprohibitionupon
the States to lay imposts or duties on imports or exports, without the consent of Congress. The same law was also declared
to be in violation of the clause giving to Congress the power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the
several States, but the court said that though theimporter could
not be required to have a license for selling a package of dry
goods in the from in which it was imported, yet this State of
things is clanged, if he sells them, or otherwise mixes them with
The general property of the State, by breaking up his pack.
ages, or traveling with them as an itinerant peddler. This decision, as explained by C. J. TANEY in the Jicense Cases, 5
How. 575, draws the line between foreign commerce, which is
subject to the regulation of Congress, and the internal or domestic commerce of a State, over which Congress can exercise
no control, and which belongs to the States; and the same view
appears to have been taken of it by C. J. CHASE, in Pervear v.
Commonwealth, 5 Wallace 475. It would be a strained construction of the power to regulate commerce "among the several States," to hold that it confers upon Congress the power to
authorize the citizens of one State to travel through another
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and sell their goods, either carried with them, or by sample
without license, whilst the citizens of the State where they thus
travel and trade can be rightfully subjected to a State tax on
their goods, and a State license to sell them. But whether the
clause in question confers such powers or not, it is sufficient
that it has never been exercised by Congress, and therefore
State laws and State regulations on the subject are valid; for
the mere grant of such power to Congress, so far as it relates
to a case like the present, is not, of itself, a prohibition to the
States, so as to render all State laws on the subject null and
void. This point, notwithstanding the difference of opinion
thereon at one time existing among the fudges of the Supreme
Court, and most conspicuously manifested in the Passenger
Cases, 7 How. 283, was settled by the decisions in Cooley v.
The Board of Wardens, &c., 12 How. 299, and in Crandall

v. State of Nevada, 6 Wallace 35. lNo such effect can be given
to the recent legislation of Congress, imposing burdens, by
way of license fees or taxes, on various occupations, with a
view of raising revenue. It has been decided that these laws
imposed a license fee only as a species of taxation, without
payment of which the business could not lawfully be carried
on, but which, nevertheless, did not propose to make any
business lawful which was not lawful before, or to relieve it
from any burdens or restrictions imposed by State legislation:
License Tax Cases, 5 Wallace 462;. Pervear v. Commonwealth,
5 Wallace 475;

Commonwealth v. Holbrook, 10 Allen 200.

'Phelaw before us being such as we have indicated, a tax by
way of license upon a particular trade or business, carried on
entirely within the limits of the State, by persons not permanent residents of the State, we are clearly of opinion it is
not invalid or unconstitutional by reason of this clause of the
Constitution of the United States.
2d. Is it repugnant to the clause entitling the citizens of
each State to all privileges and immunities of citizens of the
several States ?
Before adverting to the decisions upon this clause, it is proper, in this connection, to notice the argument that the law dis.criminates and imposes a higher rate of taxation upon mann-
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factures of other States, and goods located beyond the limits o,
Maryland, and upon those who sell them, than is imposed on
similar goods located in Maryland, and sold here by resident
traders. It is to be observed that no direct State tax can reach
goods outside of the limits of the State, but if we assume the
efibct of the law is to make discrimination in favor of the resident trader, and to protect the manufacturing and business
welfare of the State, we know of no decision, of either State or
federal courts, which would authorize us to pronounce it unconstitutional and void for that reason. In Brown v. Maryland, 0. J. MARSEULL expressly declined to give an opinion as
to the validity of a law imposing a tax discriminating between
foreign and domestic articles, and he said this with reference to
importations from a sister State. In the License Cases, 5 How.
504, the laws of several States imposing taxes, licenses and
restrictions upon the sale of spirituous liquors, were sustained
as constitutional and valid, and we do not perceive why the
reasoning of the judges, who upheld the validity of restrictions
thus imposed by State legislation, may not apply with equal
force to other cases. A trade in other articles may be carried
on in the limits of a State, in such mode and by such means, by
persons not its permanent residents, as to prostrate the commercial and manufacturing interests and business energies of
its citizens, impede the growth of its citizens, and be highly
detrimental to the general welfare and prosperity of its people,
and if so, may not restrictions and discriminating taxation, if
not amounting to actual prohibition, be legitimately imposed
upon it by State authority?

Indeed, Mr. Justice McLEAN, in

illustrating his views in these cases, makes the pertinent remark.
"A State cannot, with a view to encourage its local manufactures, prohibitthe use of foreign articles, or impose such a regulation as shall in effect be a prohibition. But it may tax such
property as it taxes other similar articles in the State, either
specifically or in the form of a license to sell. A license may be
required to sellforeign articles, when those of a domestic manufacture are sold without one." Discriminations to this extent

are made in the license laws of almost every State. Inthe case
of The People v. I hurber, 13 Illinois 544, where a law impo-
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sing a tax of three per cent. on premiums charged by agents
of foreign insurance companies, was assailed, the court held it
not to be a tax on property, but a burden imposed on the agent
for the right of exercising a franchise or privilege within the
State, which the legislature would have the right to withhold
or inhibit altogether. "It would be strange," says the court,
"if the legislature had not the power to prescribe the terms
upon which foreign corporations shouldbe permitted to come
into this State and carry on their business, or even prohibit
them altogether." And in Cumming v. Savannah,R. M. Charlton 26, it was decided by Judge BERRIEm , in 1816, that a law
imposing a tax of fifty cents on the hundred dollars on all goods,
wares and merchandise, not the produce of the State, which shall
be sold on commission in the city of Savannah, by any person
residing in its limits, was a legitimate exercise of power by the
State as a regulation of its own internal trade and commerce.
But without pursuing this series of decisions further, let us
see if there is anything in the clause as to "privileges and
immunities," which is contravened by the act before us. The
Supreme Court have declined to give a geneial construction to
this clause. In Connor v. Elliott,18 How. 593, they said, "We
do not deem it needful to attempt to define the meaning of the
word privileges in this clause of the Constitution. It is safer
and more in accordance with the duty of a judicial tribunal to
leave its meaning to be determined in each case, upon a view
of the particular rights asserted and denied therein. And especially is this true when we are dealing with so broad a provi;sion, involving matters not only of great delicacy and importance, but which are of such a character that any merely
abstract definition could scarcely be correct, and a failure to
make it so would certainly produce mischief." A partial construction was given by this court, in (ampbell v. Morris, 3 H.
& McH. 554, to the effect that "it means that the citizens of
all the States shall have the peculiar advantage of acquiring
and holding real as well as personal property, and that such,
property shall be protected and secured by the laws of the"
State, in the same manner as the prooerty of the citizens of
the State is protected. It means such property shall not be
28
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liable to any taxes or burdens which the property of the
citizen is not subjected to. It may also mean that as creditors they shall be on the same footing with the State creditor
in the payment of the debts of a deceased debtor. It secures
and protects personal righis." In the enumeration made by
Judge WASHINGTON, in Corfied v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. 0. 381,
are included "the right of a citizen of one State to pass through
or reside in any other State, for the purpose of trading, agricul.
ture, professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefit
of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions
of any kind in the courts of the State; to take, hold, and dispose of property, either real or personal; and an exemption
from higher taxes or impositions than are paid by the other
citizens of the State." And in Crandallv. The State, 10 Conn.
344, 0. J. DAGGETT held, that should a citizen of Connecticut
purchase a farm in Massachusetts, and the legislature of Massachusetts tax the owner of that farm four times as much -as
they would tax a citizen of Massachusetts, because the one
resided in Connecticut, and the other in Massachusetts, or
:should a law be passed by either of those States, that no
ctizen of the other should reside or trade in its limits, such
laws would be unconstitutional as violative of this clause in
the Constitution of the United States.
These decisions certainly show that the provision is effective
to prevent the property, real or personal, owned by a nonresident, and located in the State, from being subjected to any
higher rate of State taxation than similar property of resident
owners, but, in our judgment, they do not cover the present case.
The law before us is not a tax upon either person or property,
but on a particular trade or business, carried on in the State,
and cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as imposing a higher
rate of taxation upon non-residents than upon citizens, either
in respect to person or property. Nor do we perceive it to be
in any other respect unjust, unfair, or discriminating in opera.
tion and effect. We have shown that the State has power to
impose a license tax on all trade or business carried on in its
borders, whether by its own citizens, or those of other States.
The resident owner or trader is required to take out a license
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to carry on his business or trade, and his property and goods
here situated are also subject to State, county and city taxation.
There is nothing upon the face of the law, or in this record, to
show that the non-resident trader, doing the business thus
taxed, is thereby subjected to heavier taxationthan the resident
merchant, carrying on the like retail or wholesale business.
It certainly cannot be said to be an immunity or privilege
secured by this clause of the Constitution, that a non-resident
merchant or trader shall be permitted to come into a State, and
trade or do business therein, and pay neither a license tax on
his trade nor a tax on his property, whilst the resident merchant must pay both; to have all the advantages of a resident
trader, and escape all taxation to which the latter is subjected.
The law does notprevent his bringinghis goods here, and selling
them in the same mode and subject to the same tax as that
imposed on all citizens of the State, but simply provides that
if he keeps his goods elsewhere, and seeks to carry on the business of selling them here, by card or sample, he shall pay a
certain tax, by way of license for so doing, and there is nothing to show, and nothing in our license laws from which it can
be inferred, that the rate of license thus required exceeds in
amount the taxes to which the resident trader is subjected.
We do not, however, rest our decision altogether upon this
ground, for we are further of the opinion that even if this law is
to be regarded as restrictive and discriminatingin its character
and design, it still simply imposes a tax on a particular business, carried on in a particular mode within the limits of the
State, which it is perfectly competent for the legislature to regulate and restrain, and in so doing, has violated neither of the
clauses of the Constitution of the United States to which reference has been made. The judgment is accordingly affirmed.
United States Circuit Court, District of Virginia.
JOHN C. WOODSON v. J. M. FLECK ET IL.
The government of Virginia organized at Wheeling has been reorganized by
the United States as the rightful government of that State.
After all organized resistance to the national authoritybad ceased In Vir.
ginia, that government was established In undisputed exercise ofits authority
at Richmond.
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That government was thus established during the year 180.
When the insurgent government of Virginia was dispersed by the superior
force of the United States, the civil authorities didnot necessarilyce se at once
to elst.
They oontinued in being do facdo, charged with the duty of maintaining orde
unti superseded by the regular government.
Thus the Common Council of Harrisonburg, though elected under the insur.
gent government, remained charged with the government of the town, not.
withstandingthe temporary occupation of the place by the United States forces.
It might have been superseded, for the government of the United States was
not bound to recognize any authority which originated with the rebel government; but it was not superseded.
The Mayor and Common Council therefore exercising their authority derived
from their election, and not by virtue of a military order, have no right to remove a suit from the State to a Federal court, when that suit had been brought
f r an alleged false imprisonment and malicious prosecution thereon, charged
to have been committed by them in the discharge of their municipal functions.

THIS was a motion to remand the cause described in the
record, to the State Circuit Court of Rockingham county.
WV. W. Cruip and Roller, for plaintiff
Bradley T. Johnson, for the defendant.
The facts appear in the opinion by
CEL&S, C. J.-In this case, we are not at liberty to look at
the merits of the controversy between the parties. The only
question which we have to examine is that of jurisdiction.
The suit was originally brought in the county court of
Rockingham county, in the State of Virginia, by a citizen of
the State against other citizens of the State, for malicious
prosecution, and involfed apparently, no question arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States. It was
removed from the State court into this court by an order of
the Circuit Court of Rockingham county, in "suppcsed conformity with the Acts of Congress, providing for such removal of certain suits for acts done in obedience to the
orders of the national authorities during the recent war.
We are to inquire whether the suit thus removed is one
of those for the removal of which provision has been made
by Congress. If not, it is clear that we have no jurisdiction
of it, and it must be remanded to the court from which it came.
The modes of removal were provided by the Acts of March 3,
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1863, 12 U. S. Stat. 756, and May 11, 1366, 14 U. S. Stat.
46-one by transfer before verdict, another by appeal after
judgment. It is not necessary here to consider the second.
The first, under the Act of 1863, was a proceeding by petition
of the defendants, filed after entering an appearance; or if
appearance had been entered prior to the date of the act, then
an the next session of the court. Under the Act of 1866, the
proceeding for removal might be resorted to at any time before
the empanelling of a jury to try the cause.
The suits which might be removed in one or other of these
modes, according to the condition of the particular cases at the
time of the proceeding for removal, were fully described in the
two acts already referred to. If the suits now under consider
ation come within any description of these acts, they are certainly described by the first section of the Act of May 11, 1866.
That description includes suits for any act done during the
rebellion by any officer or person under any order issued by any
military officer of the United States, holding the command of
any district or place, within which such act was done by the
person or officer for whom the order was intended, or by any
other person aiding or assisting him therein. If this description does not include the act for which the suit in controversy
was brought, it was not as we think, within the meaning of
either Act of Congress. What then were the facts in relation
to these suits? Two of the defendants were members of the
Town Council of Harrisonburg. The other was the sergeant
of the corporation, appointed by the cpuncil. The members
of the council were elected during the war, while Harrisonburg was within the Confederate lines, and under the contro'
of the insurgent government of Virginia.
The sergeant of the corporation was elected after all organized resistance to the national authority had ceased in Virginia, and after the State government which had been organized at Wheeling, and recognized by the United States as the
rightful government of Virginia, had been established in undisputed exercise of its authority at Richmond.
This suit was brought by Woodson against certain members
of the Town Council of Harrisonburg, and against the town
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seageant for malicious prosecution. The facts appear to be
that he was arrested; that his case was examined with reference to further proceedings: and that he was discharged by
the justice of the peace who conducted the examination.
The first question is: Whether that arrest, under the Town
Council by the town sergeant, was an act done in pursuance of
any order of the officer in command of the district ? We have
referred to the General Order No. 10, issued from the post
head quarters on the 16th of June, 1865, by the military officer
then commanding the district in which Harrisonburg was situated. It is to be borne in mind that the members of the Common Council of Harrisonburg had been elected to that office
while the insurgent government of Virginia was in entire control of that portion of the State. When that government was
dispersed by the superior force of the United States, the civil
authorities did not necessarily cease at once to exist. They
continued in being de facto charged with the duty of maintaining order until superseded by the regular government. Thus
the Common Council of Harrisonburg remained charged with
the government of the town, notwithstanding the temporary
occupation of the place by the United States forces. Doubtless
it might be superseded. The government of the United States
was not bound to recognize any authority which originated
under the rebel government. But it was not superseded. On
the contrary, an order was issued, addressed to the citizens
of Harrisonburg, Virginia, .Tune 16th, 1865, by which the
citizens were notified "that the mayor and council of the corporation last in office, upon the resumption of their duties,
will be sustained in all their acts consistent with existing laws
and proclamations of the government."
Upon the promulgation of this order, the council, which had
suspended its meetings, resumed its functions. It appointed a
town sergeant, who was duly qualified. Shortly afterward a
riot broke out in the town, and the defendants, especially the
mayor and the town sergeant, were very active in quelling the
disturbance. We have no means of judging how great or how
dangerous the disturbance was. It had no connection with the
military occupation, nor any relation to the authority of the
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United States. It was an ordinary riot, and the mayor and
town sergeant busied themselves in suppressing it. In doing
so they arrested, rightfully or unrightfully, Woodson, the
plaintiff in this suit.
Now, was that act done in pursuance of the order of the post
commander? There ws nothing in the order relating to any
such matter. It was not addressed to the council. It did not
require them to arrest anybody. It did not command them to
suppress a riot. It simply declared that the council would be
sustained in its legitimate action as the town government. It
would be going too far, we think, to regard this arrest as an
act done in pursuance of an order of any officer of the United
States. On the contrary, it seems to us to have been an act
intended, at least, as an ordinary exercise of authority by.the
town council and town sergeant under the laws of Virginia.
The courts of the United States have nothing to do with
such matters. They are not constituted gauardians of the publie peace under State laws. On the contrary, these matters
are left absolutely to the State courts. The State courts watch
over personal rights and private security so far as these deIend on State laws. Individuals who exercise local authority
are responsible to them, and both are responsible to the people of Virginia.
We think, therefore, that this is not a case within the description of the Act of Congress. We are clearly without
jurisdiction of it, and must remand it to the Circuit Court
from whence it came.
A second question has been somewhat discussed, namely:
Whether, if the order in question could be regarded as directed
to the corporate authorities of Harrisonburg, and the arrest of
Woodson as actually made under that order, the arrest. so
made would warrant the removal of Woodson's suit for malicious prosecution into the United States Court after the restoration of the State government at Richmond in the spring
of 1865? But the view which we take of the first question in this
case makes the present consideration of this point unnecessary.

